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Labor Contracts, Gift-Exchange and Reference Wages:
Your Gift Need Not Be Mine!

Hernán Bejarano, Brice Corgnet and Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres1

October 2019
Abstract
We extend Akerlof’s (1982) gift-exchange model to the case in which reference wages respond to
changes in the work environment such as those related to unemployment benefits or workers’
productivity levels. Our model shows that these changes spur disagreements between workers and
employers regarding the value of the reference wage. These disagreements tend to weaken the giftexchange relationship thus reducing production levels and wages. We find support for these predictions
in a controlled, yet realistic, workplace environment. Our work also sheds light on several stylized facts
regarding employment relationships such as the increased intensity of labor conflicts when economic
conditions are unstable.
KEYWORDS: Gift-exchange, incentives, self-serving biases, reference-dependent utility, laboratory
experiments, labor conflicts.
JEL CODES: C92, D23, M54.
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1. Introduction
The inherent incompleteness of many labor contracts forces employers to rely on non-contractual
mechanisms to motivate workers. These alternative mechanisms largely rely on the existence of social
motives such as reciprocal concerns (e.g., Charness and Rabin, 2002; Casadesus-Masanell, 2004; Sobel,
2005; Segal and Sobel, 2007; Ramalingam and Rauh, 2010), altruism (see Rotemberg, 1994; Dur and
Sol, 2010; Dur and Tichem, 2015), social norms (e.g., Danilov and Sliwka, 2017) or social pressure
(Kandel and Lazear, 1992, Mas and Moretti, 2009, Corgnet, Hernán-González and Rassenti, 2015a). A
recurrent example in the economics literature is the gift-exchange mechanism according to which
workers tend to exert more effort whenever wages exceed what they consider to be fair (Akerlof, 1982).
Gift-exchange has proven to have far-reaching implications in the economics literature. For example,
gift-exchange incentives are crucial to our understanding of critical features of labor markets such as
downward wage rigidity (Bewley, 2009), cyclical unemployment (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990) or the
widespread use of implicit incentives (Fehr, Klein and Schmidt, 2007).
The empirical evidence on gift-exchange is vast and includes laboratory (Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and
Riedl, 1993, 1998; Charness, 2004; Charness and Kuhn, 2007; Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2010) as well as
field experiments (Gneezy and List, 2006; Falk, 2007; Kube, Puppe and Marechal, 2012; Cohn, Fehr
and Goette, 2015). The magnitude of gift-exchange has been shown to crucially hinge on the individual
characteristics of workers (Englmaier, Strasser and Winter, 2014; Cohn, Fehr and Goette, 2015) as well
as on specific features of the work relationship. In particular, gift-exchange has been shown to depend
on the length of the employer-worker interaction (Gneezy and List, 2006), the timing of wage increases
(Sliwka and Werner, 2017), the amount of information on employers’ profits (Hennig-Schmidt et al.,
2010) or co-workers’ wages (e.g., Gächter and Thöni, 2010).
The reason why the magnitude of gift-exchange varies substantially across contexts might be due to
the sensitivity of workers’ reference wages to specific features of the work environment. For example,
Falk, Fehr, and Zehnder (2006) showed that minimum wages might impact workers’ reference wages
even after they have been removed. These findings might explain why employers are reluctant to cut
wages right after minimum wage laws have been relaxed (e.g., Freeman, Wayne, and Ichniowski, 1981;
Katz and Krueger, 1991, 1992). In a related study, Brandts and Charness (2004) reported that the
introduction of minimum wages reduced workers’ effort even though they did not affect the magnitude
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of gift-exchange.2 The works of Brandts and Charness (2004) and Falk, Fehr, and Zehnder (2006)
inspired our current study as they provide primary evidence that, beyond specific terms of the
compensation contract, critical elements of the work environment can affect effort provision in a giftexchange setting. However, little is known about the underlying mechanisms driving these effects.
We started our reflection by extending the gift-exchange model of Akerlof (1982) to allow for
reference wages to adjust to changes in the work environment. The main insight of our model is that
economic stability favors gift-exchange. In the absence of changes in the work environment, previous
wages act as a natural candidate for a worker’s reference wage thus limiting potential disagreements
between employers and workers (see Akerlof, 1982; Falk, Fehr and Zehnder, 2006; Hart and Moore
2008; Fehr, Hart and Zehnder, 2009; 2011). By contrast, unstable work conditions tend to weaken giftexchange because they increase the set of possible values for the reference wage. For example, two
competing reference wages exist after a sudden change in workers’ levels of productivity. The reference
wage could either be set at previous levels or adjust for the changes in productivity levels. In sum,
changes in the work environment tend to multiply the number of possible candidates for the reference
wage. As a result, employers risk picking a wage that is at odds with workers’ actual reference wages.
Because employers have a strong incentive to learn workers’ actual reference wages, we might think
that any inefficiency triggered by unstable economic conditions would be short-lived. However, this
might not be the case when we consider workers’ and employers’ self-serving biases (see Messick and
Sentis 1979; Babcock and Loewenstein 1997; Konow 2000). People who suffer from self-serving biases
tend to form beliefs selectively by looking for pieces of information that support their view of the world
and by discarding contradicting evidence (Sanitioso, Kunda and Fong, 1990, p. 229). For example,
Babcock, Wang, and Loewenstein (1996) provided evidence for the role of self-serving biases in public
school teacher contract negotiations in Pennsylvania. During these negotiations, the “comparable”
districts picked by unions paid teachers significantly more than those picked by school boards.
Moreover, they showed that strike activity was positively related to the difference in salaries between
the union and board lists of comparable school districts. In our context, self-serving workers would think
they deserve a raise when their productivity levels go up while thinking previous wages should apply
when productivity levels go down. Self-serving employers would apply the opposite logic. These
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Bottino et al. (2016) study a similar environment but where the minimum wage is set at the competitive level. The authors
find that in this case, even though wage offers decline, effort levels do not.
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systematic biases tend to exacerbate the discrepancy in employers’ and workers’ views regarding the
reference wage thus opening the door to labor conflicts.
In addition to changing economic conditions, our model also accounts for the effect of
unemployment benefits on workers’ reference wages (see Akerlof, 1982). When unemployment benefits
increase, workers’ reference wages tend to be higher thus lowering the perceived magnitude of
employers’ gifts for a given wage. In that case, it might become too expensive for employers to induce
workers’ effort in a gift-exchange relationship. We thus predict an adverse effect of unemployment
benefits on gift-exchange. Generous unemployment benefits might thus demotivate workers not only
because of their negative effect on monetary incentives (e.g., Katz and Meyer, 1990; Hunt, 1995) but
also because of their negative effect on workers’ reciprocal motives (Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger,
1997).
Our conjectures are then tested in a controlled yet rich environment that combines the tight
experimental control of lab experiments with important features of the field such as access to on-the-job
leisure alternatives (Corgnet, Hernán-González, and Rassenti, 2015a, 2015b). Subjects are assigned to
one of three possible roles at the beginning of each of six periods: the employer, the employed worker
(worker, henceforth) or the unemployed worker. If employed, a worker receives a fixed wage selected
by the employer at the beginning of the two rounds of each period. Given the offered wage, the worker
decides how much to work on a tedious task (adding numbers in a table) or shirk (browsing the web).
Each piece of work (a correctly completed table) is worth 60¢ in the first round of each period. In the
second round, a productivity shock applies at random, and the value of each piece of work is either 20¢
(negative conditions), 60¢ (stable conditions or ‘status-quo’) or 100¢ (positive conditions). In our setup,
the employer also completes the real-effort task so as to earn the cash which is used to pay the worker.
If unemployed in a given period, a subject receives unemployment benefits for each of the two rounds
and is only able to browse the web during that time. Unemployment benefits are either low (40¢ in the
low benefits treatment) or high (80¢ in the high benefits treatment).
In line with our model predictions, we find that high unemployment benefits significantly abate giftexchange thus leading to a sharp decrease in workers’ production levels compared to the case of low
benefits. In our setup, the decrease in production in the high benefits treatment cannot be explained by
weaker explicit incentives because employers do not have the possibility of firing workers at the end of
the first round.
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We also report supportive evidence for our conjecture that changing economic conditions will
weaken gift-exchange. In line with our model with self-serving biases, employers select wages
according to previous wages (Round 1) (219.9¢) after a positive shock in Round 2 (224.3¢) while
slashing wages after a negative shock (124.6¢). Workers react negatively by reducing their effort on the
task compared to when no changes in productivity levels occur in which case wages are roughly kept at
Round 1 levels (211.1¢). It follows that gift-exchange is more pronounced when productivity levels are
stable across rounds compared to cases in which they vary.
Our experimental findings provide causal evidence for the main implications of our theoretical
model. Therefore, our extension of Akerflof’s (1982) framework seems to capture relevant behavioral
mechanisms underlying gift-exchange. Our contribution is a necessary step for any behavioral research
for which, unlike the canonical rational-choice framework, modeling alternatives are potentially
countless. We thus see our laboratory experiments as a necessary checkpoint before our hypothesized
mechanisms are tested in the field. In Section 5, we discuss how the behavioral mechanisms we have
uncovered can account for empirical regularities on wage setting and labor conflicts.
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1. A gift-exchange model with dissonance costs
We consider a model with one employer and one worker. The employer offers a fixed compensation,
𝑤, to the worker who then decides on a level of effort, 𝑒. The employer’s monetary profits are given by
𝑞𝑒 − 𝑤, where 𝑞 represents the revenue generated per unit of worker’s effort. Following the partial gift-

exchange idea introduced by Akerlof (1982), we consider the following reference effort function, which
captures the motivational effect of paying higher wages than the reference point:
1/2

𝑒𝑅 ≔ {(𝑤 − 𝑤𝑅 )
0

𝑖𝑓 𝑤 > 𝑤𝑅
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

[1]

Where 𝑤 is the actual wage paid to the worker and 𝑤𝑅 is the worker’s reference wage.3 In Akerlof
(1982), workers would not pick the level of effort that maximizes their utility but instead mechanically
select the reference level of effort (𝑒𝑅 ). We extend the work of Akerlof by allowing workers to adjust
their level of effort around the reference point. To that end, workers maximize a utility function in which
they face a cost for picking a level of effort which differs from the reference level. We can interpret this

Akerlof (1982) refers to the reference effort function as the “norm of gift-exchange” while sometimes referring to the
reference wage as the worker’s idea of a “fair wage”. We decided to use a more neutral terminology.
3
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cost as a “dissonance cost” which, according to Festinger (1957), arises when people experience a
discrepancy between their action (in our case the chosen level of effort of the worker) and their beliefs
(the reference level of effort). People try to minimize this dissonance by either changing their beliefs or
their actions. In our setup, this means that workers can alleviate dissonance costs by either changing
their beliefs regarding what should be the reference wage or by adjusting their level of effort. For now,
we consider the case in which workers can reduce dissonance costs by adjusting effort. In Section 2.3
we describe a model where workers can also adjust the reference wage.
In our model, the utility function of a worker can be written as follows:
𝑈(𝑤, 𝑒) ≔ 𝑤 − 𝐶(𝑒) − 𝐷(𝑒, 𝑒𝑅 )

Where 𝐶(𝑒) is the cost of effort and 𝐷(𝑒, 𝑒𝑅 ) is the dissonance cost. For the sake of illustration, we
consider the following quadratic specifications for the cost of effort function 𝐶(𝑒) ≔ 𝛽
captures the marginal cost of effort, and for the dissonance cost function 𝐷(𝑒, 𝑒𝑅 ) ≔ 𝛼

𝑒2
2

where 𝛽 > 0

(𝑒𝑅 −𝑒)2
2

where the

parameter 𝛼 > 0 captures the marginal cost of deviating from the reference level of effort. Because
reference wages are assumed to be exogenous, dissonance costs solely depend on effort choices.
Workers choose the level of effort that maximizes their utility given actual and reference wages.
Therefore:
𝛼

𝑒 ∗ (𝑤) ≔ argmax 𝑈(𝑤, 𝑒) = 𝛼+𝛽 𝑒𝑅

[2]

𝑒

In line with gift-exchange, workers provide higher levels of effort when they receive higher wages
if these wages are above the reference level (see [1]). Moreover, lower cost of effort (i.e., lower 𝛽) and
higher dissonance costs (i.e., higher 𝛼) increase the effort provided by the worker for a given wage. If
𝛼 → ∞ then 𝑒 ∗ (𝑤) = 𝑒𝑅 so that our model collapses to Akerlof’s (1982) basic framework.

Given that profits are equal to 𝜋(𝑤): = 𝑞𝑒 ∗ (𝑤) − 𝑤 , a profit-maximizing employer will offer the
following wage to the worker:
𝑞

𝛼

2

𝑤 ∗ ≔ argmax 𝜋(𝑤) = 𝑤𝑅 + ( 2 𝛼+𝛽)

[3]

𝑤

The last part of this expression can be interpreted as the gift that the employer pays to the worker,
which is the salary paid in excess of the worker’s reference wage. This gift increases with 𝑞 because the
potential gains from gift-exchange are larger in that case. It follows that motivating higher effort is more
profitable when workers’ productivity levels (economic conditions) are high. The gift also decreases
with the cost of effort, 𝛽, and increases with 𝛼 because workers are more responsive to employers’ gifts
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when it is more costly to ignore the reference level of effort. The model of Akerlof (1982) for which
𝛼 → ∞ thus constitutes an upper bound for the magnitude of gift-exchange.

Finally, a higher reference wage (𝑤𝑅 ) decreases the profitability of paying higher wages. Therefore,
the employer will be reluctant to engage in gift-exchange with the worker if the reference wage is too
𝑞

𝛼

2

high. Indeed, if we substitute 𝑤 ∗ and 𝑒 ∗ (𝑤) in the profits function, we get that 𝜋(𝑤 ∗ ) = ( 2 1+𝛼) − 𝑤𝑅 ,
which becomes negative when 𝑤𝑅 is high enough.
We summarize our gift-exchange model results in the following proposition. Details of the proofs
are available in Appendix A.
Proposition 1 (Gift-exchange)
𝑞

𝛼

2

If 𝑤𝑅 < ( 2 𝛼+𝛽) , the optimal wage and effort levels are given by:
𝑞 𝛼 2
𝑞
𝛼 2
𝑤 ∗ = 𝑤𝑅 + (
) ; 𝑒 ∗ ≔ 𝑒 ∗ (𝑤 ∗ ) = (
)
2𝛼 +𝛽
2 𝛼+𝛽
𝑞 𝛼

2

If 𝑤𝑅 ≥ (2 𝛼+𝛽) , then 𝑤 ∗ = 𝑒 ∗ = 0.
2.2. Variable reference wages
We consider an extension of the simple gift-exchange model where the reference wage might vary
in response to changes in the work environment. In particular, we focus on two key dimensions that can
affect a worker’s reference wage: economic conditions and unemployment benefits. In Akerlof’s (1982)
model (p. 561), the reference wage is defined as follows:
𝑤𝑆,𝑅 = 𝑟𝑆1−𝑢 𝑏 𝑢

[4]

Where 𝑟𝑆 is the status-quo wage and 𝑏 is the payment obtained when not working, i.e., unemployment
benefits. The weights for the geometric average are determined by the unemployment rate (𝑢).
We extend Akerlof’s specification to the case in which the reference wage can be affected by
economic conditions, captured by workers’ productivity levels 𝑞𝑖 which represent the revenue generated
per unit of effort under condition 𝑖 where 𝑖 ∈ {𝐿, 𝑆, 𝐻} (i.e., low, status-quo and high), with 0 < 𝑞𝐿 < 𝑞𝑆 <
𝑞𝐻 . We define the reference wage when affected by current economic conditions as the following

geometric average:
𝑤𝑖,𝑅 = 𝑟𝑖1−𝑢 𝑏𝑢
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[5]

Where 𝑟𝑖 captures the extent to which reference wages are affected by economic conditions 𝑖. We
consider 𝑟𝑖 ∈ {𝑟𝐿 , 𝑟𝑆 , 𝑟𝐻 } with 𝑟𝐿 < 𝑟𝑆 < 𝑟𝐻 . 4
In our model, a worker’s reference wage is either affected by the new economic conditions (in which
case it is determined by [5]) or not (in which case it is determined by [4]). Employers do not know
whether a worker’s reference wage is determined by [4] or [5] but they know, as is commonplace in
models with asymmetric information, the likelihood 𝑝 ∈ [0,1] with which the new economic conditions
affect a worker’s reference wage. It follows that with probability (1 − 𝑝) the reference wage of the
worker is the status-quo (see [4]).
In Proposition 1, we show that it is more costly for the employer to motivate effort when the
𝑞

𝛼

2

reference wage increases. It follows from Proposition 1 that if 𝑤𝑖,𝑅 < ( 2𝑖 𝛼+𝛽) for any 𝑖 ∈ {𝐿, 𝑆, 𝐻} then
𝑤𝐻∗ > 𝑤𝑆∗ > 𝑤𝐿∗ and hence 𝑒𝐻∗ > 𝑒𝑆∗ > 𝑒𝐿∗, where 𝑒𝑖∗ (𝑤𝑖∗ ) stands for the optimal level of effort (wage) when

economic conditions 𝑞𝑖 apply. Therefore, better economic conditions are associated with both higher
wages and higher effort as long as the worker’s reference wages are not too high. In that case, wages
and effort levels are not driven by the existence of a gift-exchange relationship because gift-exchange is
𝑞

𝛼

2

always observed regardless of productivity shocks. In the more interesting case in which 𝑤𝑖,𝑅 < ( 2𝑖 𝛼+𝛽)
𝑞

𝛼

2

for 𝑖 ∈ {𝐿, 𝑆} and 𝑤𝐻,𝑅 > ( 2𝐻 𝛼+𝛽) the wage offered by the employer under high economic conditions
would only induce gift-exchange when workers do not adjust their reference wage to the new economic
conditions thus picking the status-quo reference wage instead (𝑤𝑆,𝑅 ). These findings are captured in
Proposition 2.5 Details of the proofs are available in Appendix A.
𝑞

𝛼

2

Proposition 2 (Variable reference wages) Let us assume that 𝑤𝑖,𝑅 < ( 2𝑖 𝛼+𝛽) for 𝑖 ∈ {𝐿, 𝑆} and
𝑞

𝛼

2

𝑤𝐻,𝑅 > ( 2𝐻 𝛼+𝛽) .
𝑞

If 1 − 𝑝 < 𝑞 𝑆 , then:
𝐻

𝑒𝑆∗ > 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑒𝐿∗ , 𝑒𝐻∗ }
𝑤𝑆∗ > 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑤𝐿∗ , 𝑤𝐻∗ }

Kahneman et al., (1986) provide additional support for our model by finding that even though the “current wage of an
employee serves as a reference for evaluating the fairness of future adjustments of that employee’s wage”, the “entitlement
of an employee to a reference wage” can change when new conditions arise (p. 730).
5
Proposition 2 does not predict employers’ profits because the net effect of changing economic conditions is unclear in that
case. On the one hand, high economic conditions automatically increase the value of what is produced thus mechanically
increasing the employer’s profit for given levels of effort and wages. On the other hand, high economic conditions, by
increasing the worker’s reference point, might prevent gift-exchange thus lowering the employer’s profits.
4
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𝑞

If 1 − 𝑝 ≥ 𝑞 𝑆 , then:
𝐻

𝑒𝐻∗ > 𝑒𝑆∗ > 𝑒 ∗ 𝐿
𝑤𝐻∗ > 𝑤𝑆∗ > 𝑤𝐿∗

The first part of Proposition 2 shows that under stable conditions, effort and wages tend to be higher
than under unstable economic conditions. That is, by eliminating the asymmetry of information over
reference wages, stable economic conditions favor gift-exchange. Gift-exchange is most effective when
employers know the reference wage of workers. When the reference wage varies and employers do not
know for sure which one applies then they risk choosing wages which are lower than the worker’s
reference wage thus generating a negative response from workers who feel entitled to a higher wage.
Conversely, employers also risk choosing wages which are higher than what is necessary to trigger a
gift-exchange relationship.
The second part of Proposition 2 puts forward that a necessary condition for the negative effect of
unstable economic conditions on gift-exchange is that workers are not willing to follow the status-quo
𝑞

too often when economic conditions change (i.e., 1 − 𝑝 < 𝑞 𝑆 ). In the extreme case in which workers
𝐻

never adjust their reference point to new conditions, high productivity levels (𝑞𝐻 ) would always be
favorable to gift-exchange. This is the case because asymmetric information cannot play a role if
employers are certain that all workers will adopt the status-quo regardless of economic conditions.
We finish this section by studying the relationship between unemployment benefits and giftexchange. Given that 𝑤𝑖,𝑅 = 𝑟𝑖1−𝑢 𝑏 𝑢 for 𝑖 ∈ {𝐿, 𝑆, 𝐻}, it is clear that an increase in unemployment benefits
(𝑏) will increase a worker’s reference wage under all economic conditions. From Proposition 1 we also
know that a higher reference wage will lead to a higher wage and to lower profits while keeping a
𝑞

𝛼

2

worker’s effort unchanged provided that the condition for gift-exchange (𝑤𝑖,𝑅 : = 𝑟𝑖1−𝑢 𝑏𝑢 < ( 2𝑖 𝛼+𝛽) ) is
satisfied. We summarize these results in the following corollary.

Corollary 1 (Variable reference wages and unemployment benefits)
1

𝑞

𝛼

2

If 𝑏 𝑢 < 𝑟1−𝑢 ( 2𝑖 𝛼+𝛽) then
𝑖

1

𝑞

𝛼

𝜕𝑤𝑖∗
𝜕𝑏

> 0;

𝜕𝑒𝑖∗
𝜕𝑏

= 0;

𝜕𝜋(𝑤𝑖∗ )
𝜕𝑏

<0

2

If 𝑏 𝑢 ≥ 𝑟1−𝑢 ( 2𝑖 𝛼+𝛽) then 𝑤𝑖∗ = 𝑒𝑖∗ = 𝜋(𝑤𝑖∗ ) = 0
𝑖
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A key assumption in our model thus far is that workers might forego the status-quo and adjust their
reference wage to new economic conditions (𝑝 > 0). In the next section we argue that the decision to
adjust the reference wage to productivity levels might reflect self-serving motives.
2.3. Self-serving biases
We build a model in which gift-exchange is likely to fail under changing conditions because workers
and employers systematically disagree on what the reference wage is. In this model, both parties suffer
from self-serving biases which are defined as the tendency to process information in a way that is
consistent with a person’s desired conclusions (Klayman and Ha, 1987). As Babcock and Loewenstein
(1997) put forth, “self-serving assessments of fairness are likely to occur in morally ambiguous settings
in which there are competing ‘focal points’—that is, settlements that could plausibly be viewed as fair.”
(p. 111).6
Because wages generate revenues for workers but are costly to employers, self-serving biases will
tend to exacerbate the divergence in views between the two parties regarding the reference wage. We
incorporate self-serving biases by assuming that the worker systematically chooses the highest wage
among the possible reference wages stated in [4] or [5]. That is, workers’ reference wages are determined
by the status-quo wage (𝑤𝑆,𝑅 ) when economic conditions are low and by 𝑤𝐻,𝑅 when economic conditions
are high. Self-serving employers exhibit the exact opposite pattern thus picking the lowest wage in the
set of possible reference wages as their belief of workers’ reference point (𝑤
̂ 𝑖,𝑅 ). Table 1 summarizes
workers’ reference wages and employer’s beliefs across economic conditions in that case.7
TABLE 1.- Workers’ reference wages and employers’ beliefs with self-serving biases
Economic conditions
Low (𝑞 = 𝑞𝐿 )
Status-quo (𝑞 = 𝑞𝑆 )
High (𝑞 = 𝑞𝐻 )

Worker’s
reference wage (𝑤𝑖,𝑅 )

Employer’s beliefs about
worker’s reference wage (𝑤
̂ 𝑖,𝑅 )

𝑤𝑆,𝑅
𝑤𝑆,𝑅
𝑤𝐻,𝑅

𝑤𝐿,𝑅
𝑤𝑆,𝑅
𝑤𝑆,𝑅

According to Table 1, self-serving workers and employers disagree about the reference wage
whenever there is an alternative justification to the status-quo, which occurs under high and low

6

The same idea has been emphasized by other authors looking at workers and employers’ standards of fairness. For example,
Kahneman et al., (1986) emphasize that: “Disagrements about fairness are most likely to arise when alternative reference
transactions can be invoked each leading to a different assessment of the particpants’ outcomes.” (p.730)
7
In Appendix C, we extend our self-serving biases model to the case in which workers’ reference wage and employers’
beliefs in Table 1 are formed endogenously based on Konow’s (2000) model of “self-serving self-deception”
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economic conditions.8 In that case, employers believe that they are treating workers better than how they
actually feel treated.
We define ∆𝑖 : = 𝑤𝑖,𝑅 − 𝑤
̂ 𝑖,𝑅 > 0 as the disagreement between the worker and the employer over the
reference wage. According to Table 1, we have that ∆𝑆 = 0 under stable conditions whereas ∆𝑖 > 0 if
economic conditions are either high or low. We can apply Proposition 1 and substitute the optimal wage
𝑞

𝛼

2

offered by the employer (𝑤𝑖∗ = 𝑤
̂ 𝑖,𝑅 + ( 𝑖
) ) in the optimal effort function in order to obtain the
2 𝛼+𝛽
worker’s optimal effort level as a function of the disagreement over the reference wage:
𝑒𝑖∗

≔

𝑒 ∗ (𝑤𝑖∗ )

=

𝛼
𝑞 𝛼 2
(( 2𝑖 𝛼+𝛽)
𝛼+𝛽

{

1
2

− ∆𝑖 )

0

𝑞

𝛼

𝑖𝑓 ∆𝑖 < ( 2𝑖 𝛼+𝛽)

2

[6]

𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

Therefore, disagreement (∆𝑖 ) makes gift-exchange less effective because wages motivate workers
less than what the employer expects. In the next proposition we show that if the disagreement over the
reference wage is high enough, status-quo is most favorable to gift-exchange.
𝑞

𝛼

2

𝑞

𝛼

2

Proposition 3 (self-serving biases) Let us assume that 𝑤𝑖,𝑅 < ( 2𝑖 𝛼+𝛽) and ∆𝑖 < ( 2𝑖 𝛼+𝛽) for all 𝑖 ∈
{𝐿, 𝑆, 𝐻}.
1 𝛼

2

If ∆𝐻 > (2 𝛼+𝛽) (𝑞𝐻2 − 𝑞𝑆2 ), then:
𝑒𝑆∗ > 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑒𝐿∗ , 𝑒𝐻∗ }
𝑤𝐻∗ > 𝑤𝑆∗ > 𝑤𝐿∗
1 𝛼

2

If ∆𝐻 ≤ (2 𝛼+𝛽) (𝑞𝐻2 − 𝑞𝑆2 ), then:
𝑒𝐻∗ > 𝑒𝑆∗ > 𝑒𝐿∗
𝑤𝐻∗ > 𝑤𝑆∗ > 𝑤𝐿∗

There are two important differences between this proposition and Proposition 2 which was derived
in the absence of self-serving biases. First, in the presence of self-serving biases, the result that statusquo favors gift-exchange can hold even in the case in which gift-exchange exists under high economic
𝑞

𝛼

2

conditions (i.e., 𝑤𝐻,𝑅 < ( 2𝑖 𝛼+𝛽) ). Second, Proposition 2 shows that effort under stable conditions is

8

In actual work settings, there exist a wealth of possible alternatives that are not taken into account in our model (see Section
6 for further discussions). Our argument is that the set of available reference points tends to be smaller when economic
conditions are stable.
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only higher than under unstable conditions because of higher wages. However, Proposition 3 shows that
effort can be higher under stable conditions than under high economic conditions even when wages are
actually lower. This is because high economic conditions generate two opposing effects. On the one
hand, a higher productivity level has a positive effect on worker’s effort because it increases the gift
offered by the employer. On the other hand, in the presence of self-serving biases, the employer’s belief
about the gift (𝑤𝐻∗ − 𝑤
̂ 𝐻,𝑅 ) differs from the worker’s perception of the gift (𝑤𝐻∗ − 𝑤𝐻,𝑅 ). This difference
is the disagreement between workers and employers regarding the reference wage (∆𝐻 : = 𝑤𝐻,𝑅 − 𝑤
̂ 𝐻,𝑅 ),
which has a negative effect on worker’s effort (see [6]). When this disagreement is sufficiently high
1 𝛼

2

(i.e., when ∆𝐻 > (2 𝛼+𝛽) (𝑞𝐻2 − 𝑞𝑆2 )), the negative effect dominates the positive effect and hence worker’s
effort will be lower under high economic conditions than under stable conditions which is the case in
which there is no disagreement (∆𝑆 = 0).
In Appendix B we report additional results of the self-serving model which follow from Proposition
3. In Corollary B1, we show that when stable conditions are most favorable to gift exchange the decrease
in wages under low economic conditions surpasses the increase in wages under high economic
conditions (i.e., 𝑤𝐻∗ − 𝑤𝑆∗ < 𝑤𝑆∗ − 𝑤𝐿∗). Moreover, in Corollary B2 we show that the positive effect of
stable conditions on work effect increases with unemployment benefits (i.e.,

𝜕(𝑒𝑆∗ −𝑒𝑖∗ )
𝜕𝑏

> 0). Finally, we

show how the self-serving bias model and the asymmetric-information model of Section 2.2 can be seen
as special cases of a more general model.
2.4. Testable predictions
In this section we use our model results to provide testable hypotheses. The first two hypotheses
follow directly from Akerlof (1982) whereas Hypothesis 3 is derived from the model with variable
reference wages and asymmetric information (Section 2.2) and from the model with self-serving biases
(Section 2.3). Hypotheses 4 and 5 are specific to the model with self-serving biases.
In Proposition 1, we showed that gift-exchange arises as long as the worker’s reference wage is not
too high. That is, we should expect workers to exert higher effort when the employer provides higher
wages.
Hypothesis 1 (Gift-exchange). We expect a positive relationship between wages and workers’ effort.
In Proposition 1 we also showed that if the worker’s reference wage is too high, the employer will
not find gift-exchange to be profitable. Given our assumption that reference wages increase with
12

unemployment benefits, we expect gift-exchange to disappear if unemployment benefits are above a
certain threshold (see Corollary 1).
Hypothesis 2 (Gift-exchange and unemployment benefits). We expect gift-exchange to be less
pronounced and thus employers’ profits to be lower when unemployment benefits are high.
In Proposition 2 we showed that status-quo is more favorable to gift-exchange than unstable
conditions. We found a similar result when workers and employers suffered from self-serving biases
(Proposition 3).
Hypothesis 3 (Gift-exchange and economic conditions). We expect status-quo in economic conditions
to be most favorable to gift-exchange. Status-quo will lead to higher wages and effort levels than
unstable conditions.
In the gift-exchange model with self-serving biases, we showed that wages increase with economic
conditions (see Proposition 3). Moreover, employers tend to cut wages to reflect new productivity levels
when economic conditions worsen while being reluctant to increase wages when economic conditions
improve (see Corollary B1 in Appendix B).
Hypothesis 4 (Self-serving biases and wage setting). We expect the decrease in wages (compared to
status-quo) under low economic conditions to be larger than the increase in wages (compared to statusquo) under high economic conditions.
Finally, our model with self-serving biases implies that unemployment benefits tend to amplify the
negative effect of the disagreement between workers and employers over the reference wage when
economic conditions are unstable (see Corollary B2 in Appendix B). We state this finding in Hypothesis
5.
Hypothesis 5 (Unemployment benefits and economic conditions). We expect the positive effect of
stable conditions on gift-exchange to be magnified when unemployment benefits are high.
We design a controlled laboratory workplace environment to test these hypotheses. The choice of a
laboratory setup was made intentionally so as to discard a series of relevant confounds such as the
presence of implicit incentives (Becker and Stigler, 1974; Klein and Leffler, 1981; Shapiro and Stiglitz,
1984; MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989), the existence of a specific corporate culture (Hermalin, 2013),
13

the presence of hierarchies (Williamson, 1967; Radner, 1992; Qian, 1994), workers’ monitoring
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) and the delegation of authority (Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Van den Steen
2009). We do not mean to downplay the importance of each of these important features of the workplace.
Instead, we believe they deserve to be studied separately both theoretically and empirically so as to
evaluate the potential impact of each of these factors on the gift-exchange relationship.
3. Experimental Design
3.1. Virtual workplace with real effort and real leisure
We develop a framework in which subjects can undertake a real-effort task while having access to a
real-leisure alternative (browsing the internet) at any point in time during the experiment thus allowing
for on-the-job shirking (Corgnet, Hernán-González and Schniter, 2015).
3.1.1. The work task
We consider a real-effort summation task that is particularly long, laborious and effortful (e.g.,
Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Eriksson et al., 2009; Dohmen and Falk, 2011). Subjects would sum up
matrices of 36 numbers comprised between 0 and 3 for two hours, divided into 7-minute rounds. Each
table completed correctly generated a monetary value while there were no penalties for incorrect
answers. We define production as the monetary amount generated by a subject’s answers on the work
task.
Subjects were not allowed to use a pen, scratch paper or calculator. This rule amplified the level of
effort subjects had to exert in order to complete tables correctly. An example of the work task is shown
in Figure D1 in Appendix D.
3.1.2. Internet browsing
At any point during the experiment, subjects could switch from the work task to the leisure activity
that consisted of browsing the internet. Each activity was undertaken separately, in a different screen,
so that subjects could not sum tables while being on the internet. Subjects were informed that their use
of the internet was strictly confidential. Subjects were free to consult their email or visit any web page.9
The internet browser was embedded in the software so that the experimenter could keep a record of the
exact amount of time subjects spent on each activity.10

9

Subjects were expected to follow the norms set by the university regarding the use of internet on campus.
The lab policy is to forbid cell phone use inside the lab. This ensures that embedded internet browsing is an accurate
measure of on-the-job leisure.
10
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3.1.3. Organizational roles and timing
Each experimental session consisted of 12 subjects which were divided into four groups of three. At
the beginning of the experiment, subjects were randomly assigned to one of three possible roles: B
(worker), C (employer) or E (unemployed). A subject who was assigned the role of employer (C) would
keep this role for the entire duration of the experiment. Subjects which were not assigned the employer’s
role (C) were randomly matched to the other two roles (B or E) at the beginning of each period.11 In
addition, the three members of a triplet were randomly matched each period.
Each period consisted of two rounds of 7 minutes each. At the beginning of Round 1, the employer
chose the fixed wage of the worker. Given that employers were not endowed with any experimenter
money, they paid the worker’s wage using the money which was generated by both the employer and
the worker when completing the task during the round. Workers and employers could dedicate their time
to either completing the work task or browsing the web. Each table completed correctly generated a sum
of money for the employer (20¢, 60¢ or 100¢ depending on economic conditions). Unemployed subjects
received a fixed compensation paid by the experimenter and could only browse the internet during the
round.
3.1.4. Treatments
In Round 1, each table completed correctly generated an income of 60¢ for the employer. At the
beginning of Round 2, the economic conditions regarding the work task could change. There were three
equally likely conditions for which the value of a correct table was either low (20¢), stable (60¢) or high
(100¢). After subjects learnt the new economic conditions, the round proceeded exactly as in Round 1.
Our experimental design thus makes use of three within-subject conditions varying the value of a correct
table in Round 2. In addition, we conducted two between-subject treatments which varied the fixed
compensation paid to the unemployed subject. In the low benefits treatment, the fixed compensation
received by the unemployed subject was equal to 40¢. In the high benefits treatment, the unemployed
subject received 80¢ per round.

11

In a related experimental design assessing the effect of goal setting, Corgnet, Gómez-Miñambres and Hernán-Gonzalez
(2015) reported almost identical results for experimental sessions using random matching of roles each period and for
sessions using fixed matching of roles.
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3.2. Procedures
Our subject pool consisted of students from a major U.S. University. We conducted a total of 8
sessions with twelve subjects each for a total of 96 subjects (48 per treatment). The experiment was
computerized and all of the interaction was anonymous. The instructions were displayed on subjects’
computer screens. Subjects had exactly 20 minutes to read the instructions. A 20-minute timer was
shown on the laboratory screen. Three minutes before the end of the instructions period, a monitor
announced the time remaining and handed out a printed copy of the summary of the instructions. None
of the subjects asked for extra time to read the instructions. At the end of the 20-minute instruction
phase, the instructions file was closed, and the experiment started. The interaction between the
experimenter and the subjects was negligible. The complete set of instructions is available online.12
At the end of the experiment and before payments were made, we elicited subjects’ social preferences
following Bartling et al., (2009) elicitation task and asked them to complete the cognitive reflection test
(Frederick, 2005) to obtain a measure of subjects’ cognitive skills. These questionnaires lasted ten
minutes. Subjects were paid their earnings in cash at the end of the experiment. Individual earnings were
computed as the sum of the earnings in the 12 rounds. On average, subjects received a payment of $28.5
on average for an experimental session which lasted about three hours.
4. Results
4.1. Gift-exchange
In Table D1 in Appendix D, we show descriptive statistics for workers’ wage, production and
internet use. We find that wages decrease in the second round compared to the first round which is
associated with a substantial decrease in production and an increase in internet use. However, we do not
find statistically significant differences between the low- and high- benefits treatments regarding the
levels of wages, production and internet use of workers.
To test our first hypothesis on gift-exchange, we inquire on the relationship between wages and
production levels pooling the data from both treatments. In Figure 1, we illustrate that higher wages
tend to lead to higher production levels in line with the gift-exchange hypothesis and in line with
previous laboratory findings.13 This provides an additional robustness check to the gift-exchange

12

Here is the link: shorturl.at/dk056.
It is important to stress that in contrast to the classical abstract-effort gift-exchange introduced by Fehr et al., (1998), where
firm profits are defined as (𝑞 − 𝑤)𝑒, in our setup firm profits are given by 𝑞𝑒 − 𝑤. Therefore, in our design,wages are truly
fixed and thus more in line with Akerlof’s (1982) original gift-exchange idea.
13
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relationship in a case in which employers had to earn their revenues before paying their workers’ wages.
Our setup also differs from previous laboratory studies because workers had access to an alternative
leisure activity thus making effort particularly costly (see Kurzban et al., 2013). Figure 1 also shows that
the gift-exchange relationship holds regardless of the round.

FIGURE 1. Average workers’ production (in $) for each round given wages offered by employers and
pooled across the two benefits treatments.
In Tables 2 and D2 (in Appendix D), we use panel regressions to show that an increase in wages
leads to both an increase in workers’ production levels and a decrease in shirking behavior (measured
as the amount of time spent on the internet instead of working). We also report that workers’ production
tends to increase less than the increase in wages as the Wage coefficient is systematically below one
(see Table 3) so that the increase in the value of workers’ production corresponds to about half the
increase in wages. This result could be a direct consequence of our real-effort, real-leisure design which
makes providing effort particularly costly to the worker (see Corgnet, Hernán-González and Schniter,
2015). In our setup, an increase in wages leads to an increase in effort which induces substantial nonmonetary costs to the worker.
We should also note that despite a decrease in wages and effort levels over time (see Figure D2 in
Appendix D), the wage-effort relationship does not vanish over time as the coefficient Wage × Period
is never significant (see Tables 2 and D2).
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TABLE 2.- Gift-exchange: production and wages14
This table reports the results from linear [tobit] panel regressions with random effects and robust standard errors (reported
in parentheses) [with a lower bound at zero] in columns (1) and (2) [(3) and (4)]. The number of observations corresponds
to the number of triplets (32) (a triplet is a worker, an employer and an unemployed subject) for both treatments who were
matched in each round multiplied by the total number of rounds in the entire duration of the experiment which is equal to
twice the number of periods (2 × 6)). The regressor Period (Round) is the period (round) number, Table Value is the value
of completing a table correctly (20¢, 60¢ or 100¢) and High Benefits Dummy takes value one if a subject was in the high
benefits treatment and value zero otherwise.

Linear panel regressions
Dependent variable:
Worker’s production (in ¢)
Intercept
Wage

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

255.309***

226.788***

307.382***

332.496***

(50.007)

(58.471)

(63.280)

(71.227)

0.443***

0.580***

0.636***

0.527***

(0.086)

(0.215)

(0.073)

(0.158)

Wage × Period
High Benefits Dummy
Table Value
Period
Round
Observations
Prob > χ2
R2

Tobit panel regressions

-0.037

0.031

(0.048)

(0.039)

-31.739

-32.454

-56.852

-56.183

(28.336)

(28.072)

(39.286)

(39.423)

1.980***

1.979***

2.133***

2.145***

(0.509)

(0.516)

(0.576)

(0.577)

-49.268***

-41.755***

-79.617***

-86.649***

(6.498)

(9.365)

(8.014)

(12.165)

-46.311***

-46.215***

-84.152***

-84.701

(17.116)

(17.173)

(24.749)

(24.798)

n = 384
<0.001
0.397

n = 384
<0.001
0.400

n = 384
<0.001

n = 384
<0.001

*p-value<0.10, **p-value<0.05, and ***p-value<0.01

As additional robustness checks, we show that the wage-effort relationship holds when controlling
for individual social preferences and cognitive reflection scores (see Table D3 in Appendix D) and for
each round taken separately (see Table D4). We summarize our main finding below.
Result 1. (Gift-exchange). We find evidence for a significant and positive relationship between
employers’ wages and workers’ effort.
We now turn to the analysis of unemployment benefits on gift-exchange thus testing Hypothesis 2.

14

The results reported in Table 2 are robust to controlling for session fixed effects and to estimating standard errors with the
wild bootstrap procedure (Cameron and Miller, 2011) which might be preferred to clustering the standard errors at the session
level given that we have only four distinct sessions per treatment.
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4.2. Gift-exchange and benefits
We analyze wages and production levels in both the low and high benefits treatments, separately.
Wages were higher in the high benefits treatment (mean = $2.200, SD = $2.042) than in the low benefits
treatment (mean = $1.866, SD = $1.951) although the difference is not statistically significant (p-value
= 0.196).15 As is illustrated in Figure 2, the positive association between wages and workers’ production
was weaker for the high benefits treatment compared to the low benefits treatment. More specifically,
gift-exchange disappeared in the high benefits treatment in the last two periods as production collapsed,
which is not the case in the low benefits treatment. These dynamics are consistent with our theoretical
model when the marginal cost of effort (β) increases over time due to workers’ fatigue. As β increases
above a certain threshold, Corollary 1 predicts that production would go to zero. Interestingly, offered
wages did not converge to zero which might indicate that employers exhibited prosocial concerns toward
workers (see Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002).
However, the effectively paid wages actually converged to zero over time in the high benefits treatment.
That is, employers lowered their level of production so that they would end up not paying the workers’
wage (see Figure D3 in Appendix D). Employers’ production per period decreased by 44.1% from an
average of $4.834 in the first four periods to an average of $2.706 in the last two periods of the
experiment. This difference is significant (p-value < 0.001).16

FIGURE 2. Average wages offered by employers and corresponding workers’ production (in $) across
treatments. The low benefits treatment is represented on the left-hand panel and the high benefits
treatment in on the right.
15

The p-value is calculated using a linear panel model with robust standard errors using the following regressors: High
Benefits Dummy, Table Value, Period and Round.
16
The p-value is calculated using a linear panel model with robust standard errors using the following regressors: High
Benefits Dummy, Table Value, Period and Round.
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In Table 3, we conduct regressions showing that gift-exchange tends to decrease in the presence of
high benefits because the interaction term (Wage × High Benefits Dummy) is negative. However, this
interaction term is not significant when considering all periods. It reaches statistical significance in the
last two periods of the experiment (see columns (2) and (4) in Table 3) which is consistent with Figure
2.
TABLE 3.- Gift-exchange and benefits17
This table reports the results of linear [tobit] panel regressions with random effects and robust standard errors (reported in
parentheses) [with a lower bound at zero] in columns (1) and (2) [(3) and (4)]. The number of observations corresponds to the
number of triplets for both treatments who were matched in each round multiplied by the total number of rounds in the entire
duration of the experiment.

Dependent variable:
Worker’s production (in ¢)
Intercept
Wage
High Benefits Dummy
Wage × High Benefits Dummy
Table Value
Period
Round
Observations
Prob > χ2
R2

Linear panel regressions
Tobit panel regressions
All periods
Last two periods All periods Last two periods
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
249.105***
-44.220
313.549***
73.667***
(53.202)

(168.682)

(65.813)

(277.623)

0.471***

0.678***

0.610***

0.942***

(0.111)

(0.152)

(0.105)

(0.154)

-23.284

-23.675

-68.068

-170.384**

(38.755)

(21.290)

(51.246)

(77.469)

-0.045

-0.630***

0.051

-0.579***

(0.164)

(0.157)

(0.148)

(0.219)

1.989***

0.657

2.115***

0.889

(0.513)

(0.494)

(0.578)

(1.119)

-48.959***

13.194

-79.802***

-16.472

(6.574)

(23.978)

(8.031)

(50.415)

-46.522***

-24.998

-83.742***

-102.421**

(17.305)

(17.118)

(24.735)

(48.757)

n = 384
<0.001
0.401

n = 384
<0.001
0.525

n = 384
<0.001

n = 384
<0.001

*p-value<0.10, **p-value<0.05, and ***p-value<0.01

Overall, wages were 36¢ higher in the high benefits treatment than in the low benefits case which is
almost exactly equal to the difference in the payment received by the unemployed subject across
treatments (40¢). It turns out that paying workers more was not sufficient to maintain the same level of
effort in the high benefits treatment than in the low benefits treatment. Over all periods, production was
17

The results reported in Table 3 are robust to controlling for session fixed effects and to estimating standard errors with the
wild bootstrap procedure (Cameron and Miller, 2011) which might be preferred to clustering the standard errors at the session
level given that we have only four distinct sessions per treatment.
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on average 9.9% lower in the high benefits treatment compared to the low benefits treatment. This
difference is not significant, however (p-value = 0.263).18 Nevertheless, in the last two periods, workers’
production levels were overwhelmingly lower (-89.0%) in the high benefits treatment than in the low
benefits treatment (p-value = 0.002). It follows that employers’ profits were negatively affected by the
presence of high benefits (p-value < 0.001) whereas workers’ income was not statistically different
between treatments (p-value = 0.997).19 As a result, the difference in income between workers and
employers was reduced in the high benefits treatment compared to the low benefits treatment (p-value
= 0.014).
Figure D4 in Appendix D also shows that both employers’ profits and workers’ income decrease
much more rapidly over time in the high benefits treatment than in the low benefits treatment.20
High benefits are not favorable to workers’ income because their positive effect on wages is offset
by their negative effect on the magnitude of gift-exchange. Because workers did not respond as strongly
to an increase in wages when benefits were high as when they were low, employers reacted by slashing
wages over time. Importantly, the low level of workers’ production in the high benefits treatment implied
that employers were not able to pay wages in 25.0% [71.9%] of the cases [in the last two periods] in the
high benefits treatment compared to 3.1% [4.7%] in the low benefits treatment (p-values < 0.001).21 In
sum, employers who paid 36¢ more on average in the high benefits treatment than in low benefits
treatment could not compensate for the loss of motivation associated to the weakening of gift-exchange.
These results provide support for Hypothesis 2. We summarize our findings regarding gift-exchange
across benefits treatments below.
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Al the p-values in this paragraph are calculated for the High Benefits Dummy in a linear panel regression with robust
standard errors (as in Table 2) using the following regressors: High Benefits Dummy, Table Value, Period and Round.
19
Note that a worker’s income is not exactly equal to a worker’s wage as employers might not have enough funds to pay the
worker’s wage. This occurred in 14.0% of the cases. A worker’s income is thus equal to the wage effectively paid by the
employer.
20
We conduct a regression of workers’ income (employer’s profits) on High Benefits Dummy, High Benefits Dummy ×
Period, Period, Table Value and Round for each treatment and report a negative and significant interaction effect coefficient
(p-value = 0.024 for workers’ income and p-value < 0.001 for employers’ profits).
21
The p-values are calculated using a probit panel model with robust standard errors using the following regressors: High
Benefits Dummy, Table Value, Period and Round. The binary dependent variable takes value one if an employer had enough
funds to pay the worker’s wage and value zero otherwise.
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Result 2. (Gift-exchange and benefits).
i) Production levels as well as gift-exchange collapsed over time in the high benefits treatment
whereas it was not the case in the low benefits treatment.
ii) Employers’ profits were substantially reduced in the high benefits treatment compared to the low
benefits treatment whereas workers’ income was unaffected by the level of benefits. This implied
that the difference in income between workers and employers was reduced in the high benefits
treatment.
We now turn to the analysis of the effect of economic conditions on the magnitude of gift-exchange.
4.3. Gift-exchange and economic conditions
In Table 4, we report descriptive statistics regarding wages, production and internet use across
different economic conditions in Round 2. In order to be able to compare production levels between
economic conditions, we divide production levels (in ¢) by the value of a table in a given round. We
refer to this variable as table production which measures the number of tasks completed correctly in a
given round.
We show that workers’ wages were substantially decreased under negative economic conditions
compared to stable conditions whereas they were not substantially increased under positive conditions
(see p-values for Round 2 in Table 4). In line with our model with self-serving biases, employers lowered
wages under negative conditions (124.6¢) relative to stable conditions (211.1¢) while not increasing
wages significantly under positive conditions (224.3¢). Employers seemed to use Round 1 wages
(219.9¢) as reference points for Round 2 when economic conditions were positive while adjusting for
new productivity levels when economic conditions were negative. Thus, wages are not significantly
different between stable and positive economic conditions. By contrast, wages are significantly lower
under negative conditions than under stable conditions and they are significantly lower than Round 1
wages (see Table 4). These findings give credence to our model with self-serving biases (Hypothesis 4).
In addition, production under stable conditions was higher than under both negative (12.6% higher)
and positive (34.4% higher) conditions although only the latter difference is statistically significant (see
p-values for Round 2 in Table 4). However, we do not observe statistically significant differences in
internet use across economic conditions. In the last three rows of Table 4, we also show that table
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production decreased between Round 1 and Round 2 under both negative and positive economic
conditions whereas it remained constant across rounds under stable economic conditions.22

TABLE 4.- Wage, production and internet use across economic conditions
Average
Wage
Production
Production
Internet use
(standard deviation)
[in ¢]
[in tables]
[in ¢]
[in seconds]
Round 1
219.89
3.99
239.69
111.66
(204.20)

(3.76)

(225.46)

(157.60)

124.59

3.125

62.50

169.37

(166.01)

(3.69)

(73.85)

(178.40)

Round 2
Negative conditions
Stable conditions
Positive conditions

211.08

3.52

210.94

163.66

(193.04)

(3.68)

(220.65)

(169.64)

224.31

2.62

262.50

181.99

(211.27)

(3.46)

(346.18)

(182.49)

P-values23 (Round 2)
Negative vs. Stable
Positive vs. Stable
Negative vs. Positive

0.004
0.331
0.001

0.311
0.049
0.275

<0.001
0.177
<0.001

0.505
0.411
0.671

Negative (Round 1 vs. Round 2)
Stable (Round 1 vs. Round 2)
Positive (Round 1 vs. Round 2)

<0.001
0.632
0.804

0.005
0.125
0.008

<0.001
0.131
0.277

0.010
0.091
<0.001

Our model predicts that the magnitude of gift-exchange in Round 2 depends on whether economic
conditions are stable or not. In Table 5, we confirm Hypothesis 3 by showing that stable conditions
promote gift-exchange. This is the case because the coefficient for the interaction term between the
Stable Conditions Dummy, which takes value one if economic conditions are stable in Round 2 and
value zero otherwise, and Wages is positive and significant (p-value < 0.001 and p-value = 0.030 for
columns (1) and (3) in Table 5) when considering table production whereas this coefficient is positive
but not significant when considering monetary production (p-value = 0.140 and p-value = 0.217 for
columns (2) and (4) in Table 5).
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These differences were calculated comparing the same workers in Rounds 1 and 2.
The p-values were calculated for the Low Conditions Dummy or the High Conditions Dummy coefficient in a linear panel
regression with random effects taking each column header as a dependent variable. We also added Period and High Benefits
Dummy as regressors.
23

23

TABLE 5.- Gift-exchange and economic conditions24
This table reports the results from linear [tobit] panel regressions with random effects and robust standard errors (reported
in parentheses) [with a lower bound at zero] in columns (1) and (2) [(3) and (4)]. The number of observations corresponds
to the number of workers (48) multiplied by the number of second rounds they played in the entire duration of the
experiment. The Stable (High) Conditions Dummy takes value one if the value of a correct table in Round 2 was 60¢ (100¢).

Linear panel regressions
Dependent variable:

Intercept
Wage
Wage × Stable Conditions
Dummy
Stable Conditions Dummy
High Conditions Dummy
High Benefits Dummy
Period
Observations
Prob > χ2
R2

Tobit panel regressions

Table
Production
(1)
4.900***

Production
(in ¢)
(2)
166.026***

Table
Production
(3)
5.127***

Production
(in ¢)
(4)
147.936**

(0.642)

(35.151)

(0.904)

(62.636)

0.007***

0.494***

0.011***

0.783***

(0.002)

(0.165)

(0.002)

(0.137)

0.005***

0.203

0.006**

0.270

(0.001)

(0.137)

(0.002)

(0.218)

-1.194***

60.205***

-1.931*

56.733

(0.391)

(22.218)

(0.985)

(69.909)

-1.101**

149.405***

-2.104***

150.764***

(0.521)

(45.340)

(0.745)

(51.814)

-0.592

-34.902

(0.487)

(31.400)

-0.982

-66.848

(0.768)

(51.602)

-0.674***

-41.683***

-1.215***

-80.986***

(0.101)

(7.234)

(0.178)

(12.511)

n = 192
<0.001
0.470

n = 192
<0.001
0.467

n = 192
<0.001

n = 192
<0.001

*p-value<0.10, **p-value<0.05, and ***p-value<0.01
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The results reported in Table 5 are robust to controlling for session fixed effects and to estimating standard errors with the
wild bootstrap procedure (Cameron and Miller, 2011) which might be preferred to clustering the standard errors at the session
level given that we have only four distinct sessions per treatment.
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This leads us to the following result.
Result 3. (Gift-exchange under changing and stable economic conditions).
i) Round 2 wages decreased under negative conditions but they did not increase under positive
conditions. Round 2 wages under stable conditions remained at their Round 1 level and did not differ
from wages under positive conditions.
ii) The gift-exchange relationship was more pronounced under stable than under changing economic
conditions.
Finally, we test whether the positive effect of stable economic conditions on gift-exchange was most
pronounced for the high benefits treatment (Hypothesis 5). In Table D5 (Appendix D), we report that
the gift-exchange interaction coefficient (Wage × Stable Conditions Dummy) is systematically larger for
the high benefits compared to the low benefits treatment. In the tobit regressions (columns [3] and [4]),
the interaction coefficient is significant for the high benefits treatment (p-value = 0.049) while not
reaching significance for the low benefits treatment (p-value = 0.211).25 However, the difference
between these interaction coefficients across treatments is not significant. Using a three-way interaction
between Wage, Stable Conditions Dummy and High Benefits Dummy, the coefficient (Wage × Stable
Conditions Dummy × High Benefits Dummy) failed to reach statistical significance at standard levels (pvalue = 0.266 [0.294] for the linear [tobit] panel regression). In sum, we do not report compelling
evidence for Hypothesis 5 although the direction of the effect is in line with theory. We capture these
findings below.
Result 4. (Gift-exchange and the interaction between benefits and economic conditions).
i) The positive effect of stable economic conditions on gift-exchange was systematically significant
in the high benefits treatment whereas this was not the case for the low benefits treatment.
ii) However, the difference in the effect of stable economic conditions on gift-exchange between the two
benefits treatments was not statistically significant.
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Because the high benefits case could also be interpreted as a situation in which there is fierce competition for workers,
these findings suggest our main results might be robust to an experimental setting in which there exists competition between
employers.
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5. Discussion
In this section, we highlight how our research helps understand empirical regularities regarding wage
setting and labor conflicts. The evidence provided here is correlational and only serves as possible
guidance for future empirical research on the topic.
5.1. Unemployment benefits, workers’ morale and labor conflicts
There are considerable differences in unemployment benefits across countries with similar standards
of living. For example, according to the IMF, a Portuguese worker would receive three times more
benefits when unemployed than a British or North American worker. This difference may be affecting
workers’ perceptions of a fair compensation and hence their reference wages. Ultimately, an increase in
reference wages due to increased unemployment benefits could abate workers’ morale. Our study
suggests workers might be less inclined to engage in a gift-exchange relationship with their employers
when unemployment benefits are high.
Fahr and Frick (2007) show how several changes in dismissal protection that occurred in Germany
between 1991 and 2004 affected workers’ morale as measured with the rate of absenteeism at work. In
particular, they find that generous unemployment insurance is associated with higher rates of work
absenteeism. Hutchens et al., (1992) takes advantage of the institutional differences in the
unemployment insurance systems across U.S. states to study the relationship between strike activity and
unemployment insurance. They find that higher unemployment benefits are related to higher strike
frequency, which may indicate a negative effect of unemployment benefits on workers’ morale.
Although these findings are consistent with our gift-exchange model, they could also be explained
by relying exclusively on standard explicit incentive effects because high unemployment benefits reduce
the monetary costs of shirking. It seems particularly challenging to tease out the effect of unemployment
benefits on gift-exchange from their standard incentive effects using field data. Our laboratory
workplace thus provides a unique testbed for our conjectures.
5.2. Wage setting and labor conflicts under changing economic conditions
Our model and our experimental findings support the conjecture that changing economic conditions
might weaken gift-exchange. Our work suggests this happens because, under changing conditions,
workers and employers are more likely to disagree on the reference wage. Because the choice of a
reference wage is a crucial part of unions’ wage negotiations (Akerlof, 1982; Babcock and Loewenstein
1997; Mas, 2006), any discrepancies between workers’ and employers’ reference points are likely to
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promote labor conflicts. In line with our conjecture, several studies have reported that the duration and
number of strikes tend be correlated with the state of the economy (see Kennan, 1985). A more direct
test of our conjecture comes from Tracy’s (1986) work. Using panel data of contract negotiations to
study the determinants of strike activity in the U.S., the author finds the somewhat counterintuitive result
that the firm’s level of profits has no impact on the likelihood of a strike. However, the variability of
firms’ profits increases both the incidence and duration of strikes. Our model provides a plausible
explanation for these “striking” findings, namely that changing economic conditions may generate a
bargaining impasse between employers and workers because they are more likely to form different
reference wages than under stable economic conditions.
Our model as well as our experimental findings put forth that labor conflicts might be due to upward
rigidity in (real) wages when economic conditions are changing.26 That is, employers would tend not to
compensate workers enough for increased productivity levels when the economy is growing. This
implication might seem at odds with the well-known downward rigidity of nominal wages (e.g., Bewley,
2009; Fehr and Goette, 2005). However, recent evidence on downward wage rigidity is rather mixed
and highly dependent on many institutional factors associated to employment protection and contractual
regulation (e.g., Dickens et al., 2007; Babecký et al., 2010). Using data from all OECD countries on
wages and GDP levels from 1990 to 2017, we find evidence of upward rigidity in real wages (see Figure
D5 in Appendix D).27 Indeed, real wages tend to go down when the economy is in recession whereas
they tend to level off when the economy is growing. This pattern is consistent with wage setting in our
experimental study. In Table D6, we show that real wages decreased substantially during years in which
GDP contracted whereas it was not the case for years in which the GDP expanded. An increase in real
wages occurred after expansion years only with a one-year lag (see GDP growth in year t-1) whereas
the decrease in real wages in recession years occurred in the same year and was more pronounced.
One could argue that employers are likely to dedicate time and resources to uncover workers’
reference wages so as to avoid unnecessary conflicts. If this were the case, we would expect that the
negative effect of unstable economic conditions on labor conflicts might be of limited magnitude in the
field. However, our work puts forward that employers who suffer from self-serving biases will not
accurately update their beliefs about workers’ reference wages. In sum, our model as well as our
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In our model as well as in our experimental design workers’ wages should be interpreted as real wages.
Data is available here: https://www.oecd.org/sdd/labour-stats/.
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experimental findings, suggest that the impact of changing economic conditions on labor conflict is
likely to be persistent.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the behavioral foundations of the gift-exchange relationship starting by
extending the Akerlof’s (1982) model to a case in which reference wages are impacted by changes in
the work environment such as unemployment benefits and workers’ productivity levels. The main
implication of our model is that economic instability is detrimental to gift-exchange as it generates a
divergence in beliefs between workers and employers regarding what the reference wage is. This
discrepancy in beliefs is even more pronounced when we consider the case in which workers and
employers act self-servingly (Konow, 2000). For example, employers would tend to invoke the statusquo when the economy is doing well whereas employers would want to adjust wages upwards. We found
support for our main conjectures in a laboratory workplace which allowed us to manipulate workers’
productivity levels and assess their impact on the gift-exchange relationship.
Our research echoes Hart and Moore’s (2008) idea that “when the contract permits more than one
outcome, each party may feel entitled to a different outcome” (p.3). In our setup, expansions and
recessions broaden the set of plausible reference points thus leading employers and workers to feel
entitled to different wages. This phenomenon opens the door to labor conflicts. By contrast, stable
economic conditions provide a natural reference point (the status-quo) for workers and employers to
agree upon. In our model we made the simplifying assumption that the status-quo was the only possible
reference wage under stable economic conditions. Evidently, there are other possible reference points
in richer work environments. However, we still presume that the set of possible reference wages will
tend to expand when economic conditions are unstable. A potential line of future research would thus
be to consider more complex work setups in which there exist many possible alternatives for picking
the reference wage. For example, a particularly interesting endeavor would be to incorporate labor
market competition to our study. In that case, reference wages would also be affected by the wages paid
by competing firms. In addition, social preferences may influence reference wages when co-workers
compare each other’s pay. Although social preferences, as measured using the elicitation task of Bartling
et al., (2009), did not explain workers’ behavior in our study, fairness concerns might play a role in a
multi-worker setup.
Drawing on the lessons of this paper, we expect that expanding the set of plausible reference points
would make gift-exchange even weaker. This might be one of the reasons why gift-exchange has been
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found to be relatively weaker in field settings in which many alternative reference points might coexist
compared to simple lab environments (see Gneezy and List, 2006 for example).
Finally, our findings shed new light on field data by showing why labor conflicts might be more
severe when economic conditions are unstable. Moreover, our paper contributes to public policy debates
by highlighting the hidden costs of generous social benefits which might unintendedly affect workers’
reference wages thus threatening gift-exchange between workers and employers.
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8. Appendices

Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Given the anticipated worker’s effort for a given wage, the employer’s maximization problem becomes:
𝑞 𝛼

2

If 𝑤𝑅 < (2 𝛼+𝛽) , the solution of this problem is:
𝑞 𝛼 2
𝑤 ∗ = 𝑤𝑅 + (
)
2𝛼 +𝛽

Substituting 𝑤 ∗ in 𝑒 ∗ (𝑤) we get:
𝑒∗ =

𝑞
𝛼 2
(
)
2 𝛼+𝛽

Substituting 𝑤 ∗ and 𝑒 ∗ in 𝜋(𝑤), we get:
𝜋(𝑤 ∗ ) = (
𝑞 𝛼

𝑞 𝛼 2
) − 𝑤𝑅
2𝛼+𝛽

2

If 𝑤𝑅 ≥ (2 𝛼+𝛽) then 𝜋(𝑤) ≤ 0 for any 𝑤|𝑒 ∗ (𝑤) ≥ 0. Therefore, in this case, the employer would
maximize profits by offering 𝑤 ∗ = 0 which would result in 𝑒 ∗ (0) = 0 and 𝜋(0) = 0. ∎
Proof of Proposition 2
From Proposition 1 we know that the optimal wage and effort under stable conditions are given by:
𝑞

2

𝛼

𝑤𝑆∗ = 𝑤𝑆𝑅 + ( 2𝑆 𝛼+𝛽) , 𝑒𝑆∗ =
(i)

𝑞𝑆
𝛼 2
(
)
2 𝛼+𝛽

We start the proof by showing that 𝑤𝐻∗ < 𝑤𝑆∗ and 𝑒𝐻∗ < 𝑒𝑆∗.

Since 𝑒𝐻,𝑅 = 0 the employer’s profit maximization problem under high economic conditions becomes:
max 𝑞𝐻 (1 − 𝑝)
𝑤

𝛼
(𝑤 − 𝑤𝑆𝑅 )1/2 − 𝑤
𝛼+𝛽

The solution of this problem is:
2

𝑤𝐻∗ = 𝑤𝑆𝑅 + (

𝑞𝐻 (1 − 𝑝) 𝛼
) ,
2
𝛼+𝛽
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Where 𝑤𝐻∗ < 𝑤𝑆∗ iff 𝑞𝑆 > (1 − 𝑝)𝑞𝐻 .
𝛼

Since 𝑒𝑖∗ = 𝛼+𝛽 (𝑝𝑒𝑖,𝑅 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑒𝑆,𝑅 ), the optimal effort under high economic conditions is given by:
𝑒𝐻∗ =

𝑞𝐻 (1 − 𝑝)
𝛼 2
(
) ,
2
𝛼+𝛽

Where 𝑒𝐻∗ < 𝑒𝑆∗ iff 𝑞𝑆 > (1 − 𝑝)𝑞𝐻 .
(ii)

We finish showing that 𝑤𝐿∗ < 𝑤𝑆∗ and 𝑒𝐿∗ < 𝑒𝑆∗

The profit maximization problem under low economic conditions is:
max 𝑞𝐿
𝑤

𝛼
(𝑝(𝑤 − 𝑤𝐿𝑅 )1/2 + (1 − 𝑝)(𝑤 − 𝑤𝑆𝑅 )1/2 ) − 𝑤
1+𝛼

Even though there is no closed-form solution of this problem, it is clear that 𝑤𝐿∗ < 𝑤𝑆∗ for all 𝑝 > 0. This
𝑞

2

𝛼

𝑞

𝛼

2

is because 𝑤𝐿∗ = 𝑤𝑆∗ if 𝑝 = 0 and 𝑤𝐿∗ = 𝑤𝐿𝑅 + ( 2𝐿 𝛼+𝛽) < 𝑤𝑆𝑅 + ( 2𝑆 𝛼+𝛽) = 𝑤𝑆∗ if 𝑝 = 1, and the solution
lies somewhere in between if 0 < 𝑝 < 1.
𝛼

It remains to be proved that 𝑒𝐿∗ = 𝛼+𝛽 (𝑝𝑒𝐿,𝑅 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑒𝑆,𝑅 ) is lower than under stable conditions, 𝑒𝑆∗ =
𝛼
𝑒 .
𝛼+𝛽 𝑆,𝑅

From equation [1] in the main text, we know that 𝑒𝑖,𝑅 increases with (𝑤𝑖∗ − 𝑤𝑖𝑅 ). Moreover,
𝑞

𝛼

2

using Proposition 1 we know that 𝑤𝑖∗ − 𝑤𝑖𝑅 = ( 2𝑖 𝛼+𝛽) increases in the economic conditions 𝑞𝑖 .
Therefore, 𝑒𝐿,𝑅 < 𝑒𝑆,𝑅 and the result follows.
Proof of Corollary 1
The result follows directly from Proposition 1. ∎
Proof of Proposition 3
From equation [6] in the main text, we know that 𝑒𝑆∗ > 𝑒𝐿∗. This is because 𝑞𝑆 > 𝑞𝐿 and ∆𝐿 > ∆𝑆 = 0.
𝑞

𝛼

2

𝑞

𝛼

2

1 𝛼

2

Moreover, 𝑒𝑆∗ > 𝑒𝐻∗ if ( 2𝑆 𝛼+𝛽) > ( 2𝐻 𝛼+𝛽) − ∆𝐻 which is true if and only if ∆𝐻 > (2 𝛼+𝛽) (𝑞𝐻2 − 𝑞𝑆2 ).
𝑞

𝛼

2

Finally, the optimal wage is 𝑤𝑖∗ = 𝑤
̂ 𝑖,𝑅 + ( 2𝑆 𝛼+𝛽) . From Table 1 we know that 𝑤
̂ 𝐿,𝑅 = 𝑤𝐿𝑅 and
𝑤
̂ 𝑖,𝑅 = 𝑤𝑆𝑅 for 𝑖 ∈ {𝑆, 𝐻}. Since 𝑞𝐻 > 𝑞𝑆 > 𝑞𝐿 and 𝑤𝑆𝑅 > 𝑤𝐿𝑅 this implies that 𝑤𝐻∗ > 𝑤𝑆∗ > 𝑤𝐿∗. ∎
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Appendix B: Additional results of the self-serving bias model
An additional distinct prediction of the model with self-serving biases is that employers will tend to
cut wages when economic conditions worsen while being reluctant to increase wages when economic
conditions improve. In particular, in the symmetric case in which ∆𝐻 = ∆𝐿 , we can show that the decrease
in wages under low economic conditions will surpass the increase in wages under high economic
conditions. This finding in summarized in Corollary 2.

Corollary B1 (Self-serving biases and wage setting)
If ∆𝐻 = ∆𝐿 and 𝑒𝑆∗ > 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑒𝐿∗ , 𝑒𝐻∗ } then 𝑤𝐻∗ − 𝑤𝑆∗ < 𝑤𝑆∗ − 𝑤𝐿∗

Proof
𝑞

𝛼

2

The optimal wage is 𝑤𝑖∗ = 𝑤
̂ 𝑖,𝑅 + ( 𝑖
) . Therefore:
2 𝛼+𝛽
1 𝛼

2

1 𝛼

2

𝑤𝐻∗ − 𝑤𝑆∗ = (2 𝛼+𝛽) (𝑞𝐻2 − 𝑞𝑆2 ) and 𝑤𝑆∗ − 𝑤𝐿∗ = ∆𝐿 + (2 𝛼+𝛽) (𝑞𝑆2 − 𝑞𝐻2 )
1 𝛼

2

Thus, 𝑤𝐻∗ − 𝑤𝑆∗ < 𝑤𝑆∗ − 𝑤𝐿∗ if and only if ∆𝐿 > (2 𝛼+𝛽) (𝑞𝐻2 + 𝑞𝐿2 − 2𝑞𝑆2 ). If ∆𝐿 = ∆𝐻 a sufficient condition
1 𝛼

2

for this inequality to hold is ∆𝐻 > (2 𝛼+𝛽) (𝑞𝐻2 − 𝑞𝑆2 ) which, by Proposition 3, implies that 𝑒𝑆∗ >
𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑒𝐿∗ , 𝑒𝐻∗ }. ∎

The last prediction of the model with self-serving biases is that the negative effect of the
disagreement on the worker’s reference wage is magnified when unemployment benefits (𝑏) are high.
This follows from the fact that unemployment benefits and economic conditions are complementary
features of the reference wage. Applying the definition of ∆𝑖 and the definition of the reference wage in
[6] we get that ∆𝑖 = 𝑏 𝑢 |𝑟𝑖1−𝑢 − 𝑟𝑆1−𝑢 |. Therefore, high unemployment benefits magnify the marginal
impact that a change in economic conditions has on the reference wage. As a result, low unemployment
benefits would induce workers’ reference wages and employers’ beliefs to be more similar thus lowering
the disagreement over the reference wage (∆𝑖 ) hence facilitating gift-exchange under changing economic
conditions. As we show in the corollary below, this implies that the positive effect of stable conditions
relative to unstable conditions on gift-exchange increases with unemployment benefits.
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Corollary B2 (Self-serving biases and unemployment benefits)
𝑞

2

𝛼

If ∆𝑖 < ( 2𝑖 𝛼+𝛽) for all 𝑖 ∈ {𝐿, 𝑆, 𝐻} then

𝜕(𝑒𝑆∗ −𝑒𝑖∗ )
𝜕𝑏

>0

Proof
𝑞

𝛼

2

This result follows from differentiating the optimal wage 𝑤𝑖∗ = 𝑤
̂ 𝑖,𝑅 + ( 2𝑖 𝛼+𝛽) and optimal effort
function (see [7]), assuming that the disagreement is low enough for effort to be positive. That is, ∆𝑖 <
𝑞

𝛼

2

𝑞

𝛼

2

( 2𝑖 𝛼+𝛽) . Note that from [6] and Table 1 we know that ∆𝑖 = 𝑏 𝑢 |𝑟𝑖1−𝑢 − 𝑟𝑆1−𝑢 |. So, ∆𝑖 < ( 2𝑖 𝛼+𝛽) if and
1

𝑞

𝛼

2

only if 𝑏 𝑢 < |𝑟1−𝑢−𝑟1−𝑢| ( 2𝑖 𝛼+𝛽) and the result follows. ∎
𝑖

𝑆

To finish, note that the self-serving model in Section 2.3 as well as the model without self-serving
biases presented in Section 2.2. can be seen as special cases of a more general model. This general model
would assume that workers adopt a new reference wage under high (low) economic conditions with
probability 𝑝𝐻 = 𝑘 + (1 − 𝑘)𝑝 (𝑝𝐿 = (1 − 𝑘)𝑝) while employers would believe that workers adopt a
new reference wage under low (high) economic conditions with probability 𝑝̂𝐻 = (1 − 𝑘)𝑝𝐻 (𝑝̂ 𝐿 = 𝑘 +
(1 − 𝑘)𝑝𝐿 ) where 𝑘 ∈ [0,1] measures the extent of self-serving biases. In the model without self-serving
biases (Section 2.2), we considered the case in which self-serving biases were totally absent (i.e., 𝑘 =
0) whereas the current section focuses on the case in which self-serving biases are maximum (𝑘 = 1).
The general version of our models leads to conjectures which are qualitatively similar to our main
predictions regarding the negative impact of unstable economic conditions and high unemployment
benefits on gift-exchange.28
Appendix C. An extension of the self-serving biases model
We solve a self-serving bias model where people can choose between two malleable reference wages:
the default wage (𝑟𝑆 ), and an alternative wage in line with the economic conditions (𝑟𝑖 ). We interpret
the default wage as the previously received wage, and the alternative as a reference wage that people
can rationalize when facing economic shocks, which can be either low, stable or high.
We consider the case in which workers can, at a cost, change 𝑟𝑖 from the status-quo to the alternative.
On the one hand, workers want to have a higher reference wage so they can justify working less (i.e.,
generating a lower 𝑒𝑅 for any given wage). On the other hand, employers might behave as if the worker’s

28

Proofs are available upon request from the authors.
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reference wage coincides with what they want the reference wage to be (“wishful thinking”). In essence,
our model can be seen as a generalization of the basic gift-exchange model to consider situations where
workers may not only deviate from the reference level of effort (𝑒𝑅 ) but also adjust their reference wage.
The workers’ utility function used in our self-serving model in Section 2.3 is augmented by a
rationalization cost (𝐵𝑖 ) which workers incur when choosing a reference wage (𝑤𝑖,𝑅 = 𝑟𝑖1−𝑢 𝑏 𝑢 ) that is
different from the default (𝑤𝑆,𝑅 = 𝑟𝑆1−𝑢 𝑏𝑢 ). Thus, in our model, workers have two control variables: effort
and reference wages.
The worker’s problem is to choose a level of effort and a reference wage such that:
max 𝑈(𝑤, 𝑒, 𝑟𝑖 ) ≡ 𝑤 − 𝛼
𝑒,𝑟𝑖

Where 𝐵𝑘 =

1
(𝑤
𝜌
{ 𝑘 𝑖,𝑅

− 𝑤𝑆,𝑅 )

0

𝑖𝑓 𝑟𝑖 > 𝑟𝑆
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

(𝑒𝑅 − 𝑒)2
𝑒2
− 𝛽 − 𝐵𝑘
2
2

is the worker’s rationalization cost and 𝜌𝑘 ∈ (0, ∞) can be

interpreted as the degree of a worker’s self-serving bias.
In Section 2.1 we showed that for a given 𝑤𝑅 < 𝑤, the optimal effort is given by:
𝑒 ∗ (𝑤, 𝑟𝑖 ) =

1
𝛼
(𝑤 − 𝑤𝑖,𝑅 )2
𝛼+𝛽

Substituting 𝑒 ∗ (𝑤) in the maximand we get:
𝑈(𝑤, 𝑟𝑖 ) = 𝑤 − (𝑤 − 𝑤𝑖,𝑅 )

𝛼𝛽
− 𝐵𝑘
𝛼+𝛽

The worker would change the reference point from 𝑟𝑆 to 𝑟𝑖 if the following condition is satisfied:
𝑈(𝑤, 𝑟𝑖 ) > 𝑈(𝑤, 𝑟𝑆 )

Which is true if 𝑟𝑖 > 𝑟𝑆 and 𝜌𝑘 >

𝛼+𝛽
.
𝛼𝛽

Thus, if 𝜌𝑘 >
𝑟𝑖 ∗ = {

𝑟𝑆
𝑟𝐻

𝛼+𝛽
:
𝛼𝛽

𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = {𝐿, 𝑆}
𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 𝐻

As a result, if the degree of self-serving biases is sufficiently high, the worker will change reference
wages whenever economic conditions are high. Intuitively, the worker might change their reference
wages only during high economic conditions because it will create a higher sense of entitlement that
will justify working less.
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When making wage decisions, the employer anticipates that the worker will choose effort according
to the function 𝑒 ∗ (𝑤, 𝑟̂𝑖 ) where 𝑟̂𝑖 is the employer’s belief about the worker’s reference wage.
The employer’s problem is to choose a wage and belief about the worker’s reference wage to solve
the following maximization problem:
max 𝑉(𝑤, 𝑟̂𝑖 ) ≡ 𝑞𝑖 𝑒 ∗ (𝑤, 𝑟̂𝑖 ) − 𝑤 − 𝐵𝑚
𝑤,𝑟̂ 𝑖

Where 𝐵𝑚 =

1
(𝑤
𝜌
{ 𝑚 𝑖,𝑅

−𝑤
̂ 𝑖,𝑅 )

0

𝑖𝑓 𝑤𝑖,𝑅 > 𝑤
̂ 𝑖,𝑅
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

is the employer’s rationalization cost. In this case, 𝜌𝑚 ∈

(0, ∞) can be interpreted as the degree of the employer’s wishful-thinking.29

The optimal wage is given by:
𝑞𝑖 𝛼𝛽 2
𝑤 (𝑟̂𝑖 ) = 𝑤
̂ 𝑖,𝑅 + (
)
2 𝛼+𝛽
∗

Substituting 𝑤 ∗ (𝑟̂𝑖 ) in the maximand we get:
𝑞𝑖 𝛼𝛽 2
𝑉(𝑤 , 𝑟̂𝑖 ) = (
) −𝑤
̂ 𝑖,𝑅 − 𝐵𝑚
2 𝛼+𝛽
∗

The employer would choose to believe the reference wage is the lowest possible during high economic
conditions if 𝑉(𝑤 ∗ , 𝑟𝑆,𝑅 ) > 𝑉(𝑤 ∗ , 𝑟𝐻,𝑅 ) and during low economic conditions if 𝑉(𝑤 ∗ , 𝑟𝐿,𝑅 ) > 𝑉(𝑤 ∗ , 𝑟𝑆,𝑅 ).
Both conditions are satisfied when 𝜌𝑚 > 1. Therefore, if employers’ wishful thinking is strong enough,
their belief about the worker’s reference wage will be given by:
𝑟𝐿 𝑖𝑓 𝑞 = 𝑞𝐿
𝑟̂𝑖 ∗ = {
𝑟𝑆 𝑖𝑓 𝑞 ∊ {𝑞𝐻 , 𝑞𝐻 }

Finally, note that by plugging 𝑟𝑖 ∗ and 𝑟̂𝑖 ∗ in the reference wage function, 𝑤𝑖,𝑅 = 𝑟𝑖1−𝑢 𝑏𝑢 and 𝑤
̂ 𝑖,𝑅 =
𝑟̂𝑖 1−𝑢 𝑏 𝑢 , we obtain the reference wage and beliefs described in Table 1 in the main text.

Alternatively, 𝜌𝑚 >0 can be interpreted as capturing an employer with imperfect “theory of mind” (Frith and Frith, 1999).
When reasoning, a person with high theory of mind is aware of the thinking process, so he is able to represent a belief as
separate from the world is representing (Stanovich 2015). In other words, employers with perfect theory of mind (𝜌𝑚 =0)
are able to acknowledge that workers are forming self-serving reference wages, which would lead to rational beliefs (𝑤
̂𝑖,𝑅 =
𝑤𝑖,𝑅 ). Employers with imperfect theory of mind, on the other hand, lack this ability to mentalize and hence will think that
their wishful-thinking beliefs are shared by workers, leading to a false sense of consensus. Of course, in a repeated interaction,
employers with high theory of mind might be able to infer workers’ true reference wages over time even if they start with
the wrong beliefs because of lack of information about their preferences. However, people with low theory of mind will not
so easily adjust their wrong beliefs, which is the essence of confirmation bias.
29
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Appendix D. Additional Figures, Tables and Robustness analyses

FIGURE D1.- Example of table summation for the work task.

FIGURE D2. Average workers’ production and wages (in $) per period pooled across the two benefits
treatments.
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FIGURE D3. Average workers’ production and effectively-paid wage (in $) per period for the low (left
panel) and high (right panel) benefits treatments.

FIGURE D4. Period-evolution of average employers’ profits (workers’ income) across treatments in
the left (right) panel.
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FIGURE D5. Kernel density estimates for yearly changes in real wages (in %) for all OECD countries
between 1990 and 2017 for the case in which real GDP was either growing or contracting in the
corresponding year.
TABLE D1.- Wage, production and internet use across treatments
Wage
Production
Internet use
Average
(standard deviation)
[in ¢]
[in ¢]
[in seconds]
Round 1
192.28
245.62
127.18
Low benefits
(203.36)

High benefits
All

(218.52)

(155.04)

247.50

233.75

106.15

(202.33)

(233.19)

(160.25)

219.89

239.69

116.66

(204.20)

(225.46)

(157.60)

Round 2
Low benefits
High benefits
All
P-values30
Low vs. high (Round 1)
Low vs. high (Round 2)
Low vs. high (All rounds)
Low (Round 1 vs. Round 2)
High (Round 1 vs. Round 2)
All (Round 1 vs. Round 2)

177.92

194.37

168.55

(210.80)

(265.37)

(171.88)

195.41

162.92

174.80

(178.75)

(242.86)

(181.19)

186.66

178.65

171.68

(195.11)

(254.19)

(176.16)

0.121
0.428
0.196
0.401
0.002
0.008

0.781
0.721
0.263
0.018
0.010
<0.001

0.442
0.943
0.949
0.002
0.001
<0.001

30

The p-values were calculated for the High Benefits Dummy or the Round coefficient in a linear panel regression with
random effects taking each column header as dependent variable. We also added Period as a regressor and Table Value (20¢,
60¢ or 100¢) when Round 2 observations were included in the regression.
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TABLE D2.- Gift-exchange: internet use and wages31
This table reports the results from linear [tobit] panel regressions with random effects and robust standard errors (reported in
parentheses) [with a lower bound at zero and an upper bound at 600 seconds] in columns (1) and (2) [(3) and (4)]. The number
of observations corresponds to the number of workers (48) multiplied by the number of rounds they played in the entire duration
of the experiment which is equal to twice the number of periods.

Dependent variable:
Internet use (seconds)
Intercept
Wage

(1)

(2)

[3]

[4]

48.408

48.910

-121.258*

-86.885

(37.572)

(50.426)

(69.017)

(75.035)

-0.317***

-0.320**

-0.813***

-1.026***

(0.052)

(0.125)

(0.097)

(0.211)

Wage × Period
High Benefits Dummy
Table value
Period
Round
Observations
Prob > χ2
R2

0.001

0.059

(0.027)

(0.051)

1.586

1.579

28.519

29.523

(25.033)

(28.069)

(57.302)

(58.088)

0.441

0.441

1.057**

1.074**

(0.285)

(0.285)

(0.514)

(0.513)

18.583***

18.454*

29.487***

20.516*

(6.463)

(10.587)

(7.446)

(10.697)

44.463***

44.464***

76.481***

75.316***

(12.361)

(12.380)

(23.353)

(23.299)

n = 384
<0.001
0.225

n = 384
<0.001
0.225

n = 384
<0.001
-

n = 384
<0.001
-

*p-value<0.10, **p-value<0.05, and ***p-value<0.01

31

Following Cameron and Miller (2011), we also estimated standard errors using the wild bootstrap procedure because
clustering at the session level given that we have only four distinct sessions per treatment is not an adequate procedure. The
use of this procedure led to p-values that are similar to the ones reported in the results section. Similar results are also obtained
when controlling for session fixed effects.

44

TABLE D3.- Gift-exchange: production and wages32
This table reports the results from linear panel regressions with random effects and robust standard
errors (reported in parentheses). The number of observations corresponds to the number of
workers (32) multiplied by the number of rounds they played in the entire duration of the
experiment (12).

Worker’s
production
(1)
297.479***

Dependent variable:

Intercept
Wage
High Benefits Dummy
Table value
Cognitive Reflection Test scores

Internet
use
(2)
-7.513

(61.368)

(50.800)

0.448***

-0.311***

(0.088)

(0.054)

-48.438

7.233

(29.277)

(26.959)

1.969***

0.423

(0.517)

(0.285)

-41.378***

14.881

(15.303)

(18.216)

-50.221*

11.951

(30.587)

(35.034)

Social preferences33
Prosociality
Costly prosociality
Envy
Costly envy

Period
Round
Observations
Prob > χ2
R2

-8.640

-5.397

(39.479)

(31.739)

31.865

-20.051

(32.722)

(30.164)

-8.378

68.729**

(36.567)

(34.848)

-48.476***

18.368***

(6.456)

(6.471)

-46.028***

44.943

(17.206)

(12.350)

n = 384
<0.001
0.416

n = 384
<0.001
0.234

*p-value<0.10, **p-value<0.05, and ***p-value<0.01
32

Following Cameron and Miller (2011), we also estimated standard errors using the wild bootstrap procedure because
clustering at the session level given that we have only four distinct sessions is not an adequate procedure. The use of this
procedure led to p-values that are similar to the ones reported in the results section. Adding session fixed effect also lead to
similar results.
33
Social preferences are defined as in Bartling et al., (2009) (see p.94). People are categorized as prosocial (costly prosocial)
if they choose the egalitarian allocation that gives more money to the other person at no (a) cost for themselves. The
prosociality variable is binary and takes value one only if a person is categorized as prosocial (costly prosocial). People are
categorized as envious (costly envious) if they choose the egalitarian allocation that gives less money to the other person at
no (a) cost for themselves. The envy (costly envy) variable is binary and takes value one only if a person is categorized as
envious (costly envious).
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TABLE D4.- Gift-exchange: production, internet and wages per round34
This table reports the results from linear panel regressions with random effects and robust standard errors (reported in
parentheses). The number of observations corresponds to the number of workers (32) multiplied by the number of first or
second rounds they played in the entire duration of the experiment.

Worker’s production
Dependent variable:

Intercept
Wage
High Benefits Dummy

Round 1
(1)

Round 2
(2)

Round 1
(3)

Round 2
(4)

352.605***

134.205***

115.413***

154.773***

(42.400)

(32.525)

(28.271)

(35.011)

0.398***

0.558***

-0.331

-0.326***

(0.079)

(0.135)

(0.050)

(0.062)

-32.555

-34.172

-1.487

7.287

(34.094)

(31.993)

(24.328)

(30.698)

Observations
Prob > χ2
R2

0.436

1.787

Table value
Period

Internet use

(0.311)

(0.573)

-53.857***

-42.657***

21.436***

13.072*

(7.981)

(7.178)

(6.661)

(7.809)

n = 192
<0.001
0.327

n = 192
<0.001
0.456

n = 192
<0.001
0.215

n = 192
<0.001
0.173

*p-value<0.10, **p-value<0.05, and ***p-value<0.01

34

Following Cameron and Miller (2011), we also estimated standard errors using the wild bootstrap procedure because
clustering at the session level given that we have only four distinct sessions per treatment is not an adequate procedure. The
use of this procedure led to p-values that are similar to the ones reported in the results section. Adding session fixed effect
also lead to similar results.
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Table D5.- Gift-exchange interaction between economic conditions and benefits35
This table reports the results from linear [tobit] panel regressions with random effects and robust standard errors (reported in
parentheses) [with a lower bound at zero] in columns (1) and (2) [(3) and (4)]. The number of observations corresponds to the
number of workers multiplied by the number of second rounds they played in the entire duration of the experiment.

Dependent variable:
Table Production

Low benefits
(1)
4.004***

High benefits
(2)
5.130***

Low benefits
[3]
3.940***

High benefits
[4]
5.724***

(0.856)

(0.826)

(1.184)

(1.075)

0.007***

0.008***

0.009***

0.012***

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.003)

(0.003)

0.004***

0.006***

0.005

0.009**

(0.001)

(0.002)

(0.004)

(0.005)

-1.138**

-1.461**

-1.771

-2.834**

(0.578)

(0.661)

(1.281)

(1.408)

-0.785

-1.608**

-1.518

-2.870***

(0.819)

(0.669)

(0.979)

(1.069)

-0.436***

-0.914***

-0.804***

-1.677***

(0.121)

(0.143)

(0.239)

(0.240)

Observations
Prob > χ2

n = 96
<0.001

n = 96
<0.001

n = 96
<0.001

n = 96
<0.001

R2

0.439

0.533

Intercept
Wage
Wage × Stable Conditions
Dummy
Stable Conditions Dummy

High Conditions Dummy
Period

*p-value<0.10, **p-value<0.05, and ***p-value<0.01

35

Following Cameron and Miller (2011), we also estimated standard errors using the wild bootstrap procedure because
clustering at the session level given that we have only four distinct sessions is not an adequate procedure per treatment. The
use of this procedure led to p-values that are similar to the ones reported in the results section.
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TABLE D6.- Real wages and GDP growth
This table reports the results from linear panel regressions with robust standard errors
(reported in parentheses) and country and year fixed effects for yearly changes in real wages
(in %) in the 35 OECD countries between 1990 and 2017.36

Dependent variable:

Real wages growth (%) in year t

Years
Intercept

Expansion years
(GDP growth > 0)
(1)
0.012

Recession years
(GDP growth < 0)
(2)
-0.022

(0.007)

(0.036)

0.083

0.988***

GDP growth (%) in year t
GDP growth (%) in year t-1
Country and
effects
Observations
Prob > χ2
R2

year

(0.150)

(0.223)

0.136**

-0.029

(0.059)

(0.209)

Yes

Yes

n = 787
<0.001
0.355

n = 62
<0.001
0.894

fixed

*p-value<0.10, **p-value<0.05, and ***p-value<0.01

36

This excludes the two countries which recently joined the organization: Latvia (in 2016) and Lithuania (in 2018).
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